Pay-As-Bid Vs. First-Price Auctions
Author | : Milena Wittwer |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 35 |
Release | : 2018 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1304467118 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book Pay-As-Bid Vs. First-Price Auctions written by Milena Wittwer and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Pay-as-bid auctions extend the rules of the well-known first-price auction to the sale of multiple units of the same good. According to a common understanding of the recent literature, strategic incentives in pay-as-bid auctions differ from those in the first-price auctions when bidders have multi-unit demand. I show that each of N symmetrically informed bidders shades his bid for 1 of N shares of a perfectly divisible good in a pay-as-bid auction as if he competed with (N-1)N bidders for one indivisible good in a first-price auction. This analogy carries over to environments where bidders have pri- vate information if equilibrium demand schedules are additively separable in the type but breaks otherwise. Whether bidding in pay-as-bid auctions is more complex than in first-price auctions thus depends on the type of uncertainty bidders face.