Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining
Author | : Levent Çeli̊k (Ph.D.) |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 2011 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:744260463 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining written by Levent Çeli̊k (Ph.D.) and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game a la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations - some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.